Colombia -- the armed conflict will continue under a new president (Int. Crisis Group Update)

I am usually impressed with bulletins published by the International Crisis Group. Their analyses of arenas of conflict tend to be spot on. This briefing, however, seems to focus on the wrong things. The new Colombian government, like so many others, must focus on getting rid of corruption and impunity -- about 95 percent of all violent crimes still go unpunished! The incoming government must address violations of human rights; it must address pervasive poverty, lack of schools, health care and infrastructure; it must redress the past government's near-fascist attitude, especially towards the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities in remote areas and human rights defenders.

However, read this latest bulletin for yourself, if you will:

Improving Security Policy in Colombia

Latin America Briefing N°23 29 Jun 2010

OVERVIEW

President Álvaro Uribe’s eight-year military campaign against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has taken a heavy toll on Colombia’s largest insurgent organisation. The government is now working to consolidate security gains by expanding state presence in several of the formerly most conflict-ridden regions. This strategy faces numerous challenges, not least because FARC’s command and control structure has not collapsed. The insurgents are adapting to military pressure through guerrilla warfare tactics, aggressive recruitment among rural populations, broadened involvement in drug trafficking and alliances with other armed groups and drug-trafficking organisations. Colombia’s next president, Juan Manuel Santos, will take office on 7 August. As part of an integrated conflict resolution strategy, his government must increase the country’s law enforcement and military capability against all illegal armed groups, including FARC. It also has to strengthen institutions, expand the rule of law, rigorously protect human rights, reduce poverty and design the political/negotiations component of a successful conflict resolution strategy. Security consolidation can only take root if Colombia tackles its pervasive problems of organised violence, criminality and illegality in an integrated manner.

Uribe’s sustained military campaign against FARC has produced tangible results but did not break the backbone of the 45-year old insurgency. While FARC has lost thousands of fighters due to deaths in combat, captures and desertions, it is estimated to still have 8,000-10,000 troops. Coerced recruitment of new members, mostly children and youngsters, among vulnerable groups such as Afro-Colombians and indigenous communities is ongoing. FARC has resorted to guerrilla tactics and the massive use of antipersonnel mines as well as snipers. It has expanded its participation in drug trafficking in Colombia and other parts of Latin America, particularly Panama, Venezuela, Brazil and Ecuador.

A number of FARC units have formed alliances with other illegal armed groups, including paramilitary successors and new illegal armed groups (NIAGs), such as Rastrojos and Paisas. Alliances are mostly centred on drug trafficking. While often temporary and fragile, as with Colombia’s second-largest insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), they add a new dimension to the conflict. Uribe’s military strategy against FARC was successful up to a point because it aimed at a more or less clearly defined and identified target. The threat posed by paramilitary successor groups, NIAGs and other criminal actors, and the alliances between them and FARC and ELN, is of a different, less structured and visible kind. There is mounting evidence that Colombia’s security forces lack a strategy to confront this new threat.

The new government should reassess current security policy and the efforts underway to consolidate the gains made under Uribe. The incoming Santos administration should acknowledge that Colombia has still not reached the post-conflict phase and implement an integrated conflict resolution strategy, which will be the subject of a forthcoming Crisis Group report. On security issues, the government should:

• Maintain military pressure on FARC while effectively responding to the insurgents’ new modi operandi and their broadened participation in drug trafficking, while avoiding the human rights violations that have tarnished the record of the armed forces. This requires improving military intelligence and operational capacities as well as regional security cooperation, particularly with Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. As tense relations with Venezuela have facilitated an increase in cross-border crime, the incoming Colombian government has to make every effort to open a new chapter of bilateral cooperation in order to effectively cut off supply routes, support networks and trafficking chains. Relations with Ecuador also need to be fully re-established.
• Develop and implement a comprehensive citizen security strategy to address the different threats emerging from FARC, ELN, paramilitary successors and NIAGs to both rural and urban populations. This strategy should be based on in-depth analysis of the new tactics of, and alliances among, the different armed groups and their impact on citizen security. Increased protection of civilians, especially among vulnerable groups such as indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, is essential.
• Tackle the threat posed by paramilitary successors and NIAGs by (a) officially acknowledging the expansion and complex nature of paramilitary successors and NIAGs and the severe humanitarian impact caused by their actions; (b) stepping up efforts to integrate effective law enforcement with military measures; and (c) decisively fighting and ending collusion and ties between illegal armed groups and members of local authorities and the security forces.
• Advance military and citizen security policy reform in tandem with the implementation of the security consolidation strategy so as to increase the chances of success of the latter and rapidly shift it to a civilian-led operation with a whole-of-government budgetary commitment.

Bogotá/Brussels, 29 June 2010

Colombia: Protecting Human Rights and Improving Security

Hello again

I've been busy taking my parents around these lovely parts for the past nearly two weeks. We've had a great time and photos will follow as soon as I've had time to catch up a bit. It's not all that easy being chauffeur, tour guide, blogger and - last but not least - business owner... But great fun, even if the weather did not always cooperate fully (mostly did, though).

Here comes the latest report from the International Crisis Group, received yesterday. This information needs to be read by as many people as possible, so I'm posting it in full, quoting from **** to *****. Click on the title of this post to be taken to their website:
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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW BRIEFING
The Virtuous Twins: Protecting Human Rights and Improving Security in Colombia
Bogota/Brussels, 25 May 2009: Colombia’s government must urgently address human rights abuses to enhance its security policy and bring lasting peace to the country.

The Virtuous Twins: Protecting Human Rights and Improving Security in Colombia,* the latest policy briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the security gains made by the Uribe administration over seven years and warns that immediate steps are needed to address human rights concerns. The government argues that the human rights record has improved with its “democratic security policy”, but serious abuses, including of international humanitarian law, persist and in some instances are even increasing.
“The Uribe administration promotes an optimistic vision of Colombia on the verge of overcoming its internal conflict, but the conflict is evolving, not ending”, Mauricio Angel Morales, Crisis Group Senior Analyst, says. “It should make a much stronger commitment to protecting human rights, not least to preserve and expand the security gains”.
The Uribe administration has focused on the military struggle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and paramilitary and new illegal armed groups (NIAGs) – all responsible for multiple atrocities against civilians. But forced displacement and violence against vulnerable sectors, including ethnic minorities and women, remains widespread. NIAGs, at times with acquiescence of security personnel and some government officials, have stepped up intimidation and violence against civilians; the government’s early warning system to prevent abuses is inefficient; and the sluggish justice system is an ineffective deterrent.
In an effort to curb violations by security forces, especially against the rural and urban poor, the government has issued a human rights policy, increased human rights training for security forces and taken other measures, including holding to account military officers involved in extrajudicial killings of innocent civilians. These are important initial steps, but security forces still have a long way to go regarding accountability, professionalism and full commitment to human rights.
The government and the human rights community need to overcome mutual distrust by dialogue and concrete actions, starting with an end to officials’ efforts to link human rights organisations with the guerrillas. The U.S., Canada and the EU should actively promote rapprochement between the security forces and human rights advocates.
“The priorities of the government and human rights defenders are not mutually exclusive, but reinforcing”, says Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group’s Latin America Director. “Ending the internal armed conflict urgently requires improved security with full respect for Colombians’ fundamental rights”.
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Colombia: new Crisis Group Report highlights serious shortcomings in judicial system

Hello again

Those of you who know me know how close to my heart almost all matters Colombian remain even though I have taken myself off to Scotland. And so I hasten to distribute the latest dire report out of that beautiful country, where all is far from well.
Indigenous populations have been struggling to have their land rights protected; indeed, only in the past few weeks, many reports have reached me of serious infringements of human rights against these populations by the Colombian armed forces. Afro-Caribbean communities also report serious difficulties. The so-called Law of Justice and Peace, which came into force in 2005, has been anything but what the name leads one to imagine. In fact, it has been quite Orwellian in its effects. I am, therefore, a little surprised that the International Crisis Group, whose analyses I hold in the greatest esteem, seem to have taken it at face value. However, I suppose that's exactly what one should do: hold the Uribe government to account on the laws it has passed.

Read for yourself, for yourselves, if you will:
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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT

Correcting Course: Victims and the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia

Bogotá/Brussels, 30 October 2008: Critically undermined by government disinterest in the victims of the armed conflict, transitional justice in Colombia seriously risks failing.
Correcting Course: Victims and the Justice and Peace Law in Colombia,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, argues that the Uribe government has given much higher priority to military efforts to reestablish security than to defence and promotion of victims’ rights. This discordance has stymied implementation of the 2005 Justice and Peace Law (JPL) and threatens efforts to end impunity, a key cause of the conflict.
“The 155,000 registered victims of Colombia’s conflict, in particular of paramilitary violence, are onlookers to, not actors in, a lagging transitional justice process”, says Juan Munévar, Crisis Group’s Colombia Analyst. “There is great need to increase protection of victims from illegal armed groups and expand the rule of law across the country to ensure their active participation”.
Problems are exacerbated by serious operational and financial bottlenecks in the judicial process and the persistence of armed conflict. Civil society and human rights organisations are trying to reach out to victims and give them legal and other help, but they represent only a small sector of the large and fragmented victim universe. The National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (NCRR), charged with defending and promoting victims’ interests, has been hamstrung by its closeness to the government and internal divisions.
The conflict with the FARC insurgency and the emergence of new illegal armed groups are major obstacles. Victims have been able to increase their participation only in regions where such groups have not yet emerged, the security forces have expanded their territorial control, coordination between institutions is good and the NCRR has shown leadership.
To avoid failure, greater government commitment to rigorous JPL implementation is required, as is an integrated victims and reparations strategy. The current debate in Congress about a new victims law is an opportunity for government and political opposition to work together and engage victims, human rights and civil society organisations in design of a policy seen as an essential component of, not a competitor with, the effort to win the struggle with illegal armed groups.
“The Uribe administration must combine military efforts with rigorous JPL implementation if it is to prevent the transitional justice process from failing”, warns Markus Schultze-Kraft, Latin America Program Director. “Consolidating security and the rule of law depend not only on permanent police and military presence, but also on the successful pursuit of justice, reparations, truth and reconciliation”.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635
Kimberly Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601
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*Read the full Crisis Group report on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org
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Peace and social justice is what Colombia needs. Let's work together to achieve that goal.

Colombia: The government and the ELN

Hello again!
You know how close to my heart Colombia is -- I studied its literature when I was at university; I have relatives there; and I know a lot of Colombians in exile here in Switzerland. Moreover, since 2003 I've been a member (board member since 2005) of a human rights and peace NGO here in Switzerland, the ask!-Arbeitsgruppe Schweiz-Kolumbien (www.askonline.ch). ask! primarily disseminates information about Colombia to stakeholders and policymakers in Switzerland and in Europe.
It is often very difficult to obtain information that has not been spun out of all recognition by the highly efficient government of Colombia, whose grip on the national media is perhaps even tighter than that of their friends in power on the northern part of the American continents.
Which means that, every now and then, I am taking the liberty of posting here something in English concerning that conflict-riddled yet extremely beautiful and vivacious country in South America.
Today it's a report from the International Crisis Group, a body of highly respected political analysts and top-level diplomats -- not a bunch of people to be disregarded lightly, I'd say...

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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW BRIEFING
Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?

Bogotá/Brussels, 11 October 2007: The peace process between Alvaro Uribe's government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) risks failure unless both parties establish the trust needed to overcome substantive bottlenecks.

Colombia: Moving Forward with the ELN?
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The latest policy briefing from the International Crisis Group examines the need for the government and the ELN, much the smaller of the country's two left-wing insurgencies, to restore momentum in their negotiations, including unilateral measures to stimulate confidence. Establishing a ceasefire is central to success but while the government wants the ELN to concentrate in specific locations and identify its combatants, the rebels feel that they must stay mobile within specified corridors to ensure their protection, including against the more powerful FARC. Both agree de-mining and a halt to kidnapping would be important steps but questions remain about their viability outside the framework of a ceasefire.
"The mutual distrust explains why no ceasefire has been agreed," says Crisis Group Analyst Juan Munévar. "The government suspects the ELN will continue to do intelligence, logistical and political work through its urban militias, and the ELN believes the government wants combatant identification only to gain a military advantage in case negotiations break down."
The peace process has moved from an exploratory phase towards a formal dialogue, with the accompaniment of Norway, Spain and Switzerland. However, eight rounds of talks since December 2005 have not yet produced tangible results. While Uribe's tough security policy has reduced the ELN's military capability, the group has managed to survive by staying mobile and adapting to local conflict conditions.
In order for the peace process not only to continue, but to succeed, it is paramount to focus on incentives and guarantees that will help overcome bottlenecks. The ELN and the government should make unilateral goodwill gestures with the aim of establishing mutual trust. The ELN should release kidnap victims, de-mine some areas, make available information on what percentage of its combatants and unarmed militias are women and children and propose a model for ceasefire implementation and verification.
The Uribe administration should be more flexible on a complete cessation of hostilities and the concentration and identification of ELN troops in a ceasefire. Norway, Spain and Switzerland should consider offering their know-how on implementation of ceasefires, temporary concentrations of fighters, protected corridors and third-party verification.
"Many in Colombia believe the ELN is no longer a threat, so the government is under no pressure to conclude the negotiations," says Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group's Latin America Program Director. "This reasoning is flawed. The ELN is not defeated, and unless the parties overcome their recalcitrance, the peace process may fail."
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Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) 32 (0) 2 541 1635
Giulia Previti (Washington) 1 202 785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?action=form&fid=16&l=1

*Read the full Crisis Group briefing on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation covering some 60 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
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